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Abstract
We introduce learning in a principal-agent model of stochastic output sharing under moral haz-
ard. Without knowing the agents’ preferences and technology the principal tries to learn the optimal
agency contract. We implement two learning paradigms - social (learning from others) and individ-
ual (learning by doing). We use a social evolutionary learning algorithm (SEL) to represent social
learning. Within the individual learning paradigm, we investigate the performance of reinforcement
learning (RL), experience-weighted attraction learning (EWA), and individual evolutionary learning
(IEL). Overall, our results show that learning in the principal-agent environment is very diﬃcult.
This is due to three main reasons: (1) the stochastic environment, (2) a discontinuity in the payoﬀ
space in a neighborhood of the optimal contract due to the participation constraint and (3) incorrect
evaluation of foregone payoﬀs in the sequential game principal-agent setting. The ﬁrst two factors
apply to all learning algorithms we study while the third is the main contributor for the failure of
the EWA and IEL models. Social learning (SEL), especially combined with selective replication, is
much more successful in achieving convergence to the optimal contract than the canonical versions
of individual learning from the literature. A modiﬁed version of the IEL algorithm using realized
payoﬀ evaluation performs better than the other individual learning models; however, it still falls
short of the social learning’s ability to converge to the optimal contract.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is well known that the optimal contracts in principal-agent settings take complicated forms due to
the intricate trade-oﬀ between provision of incentives and insurance. The optimal contract depends
crucially on the principal’s and agent’s preferences, the properties of the production technology, as
well as the stochastic properties of the income process1. The existing literature typically assumes that
actions undertaken by the agent are unobservable or non-veriﬁable by the principal. However, at the
same time, the principal has perfect knowledge of objects that are realistically much harder or at least
as hard to know or observe such as the agent’s preferences, the agent’s decision making process, or the
properties of the output technology.
In this paper, we explicitly model the principal’s learning process based only on observable in-
formation such as output realizations. Our primary objective is to investigate whether this learning
process leads to knowledge acquisition suﬃcient for convergence to the theoretically optimal contract
in a standard principal-agent model of contracting under moral hazard (e.g. Hart and Holmstrom,
1987).
We use two alternative paradigms, social and individual learning, to describe the principal’s learning
process. Our social learning paradigm represents a way of explicit micro-level modeling of what is
referred to in the literature as “learning spillovers”, or “learning from others”. At the same time, our
individual learning paradigm can be viewed as an explicit micro-level modeling of “learning by doing”
(e.g. Arrow, 1962; Stokey, 1988).
A large number of empirical studies in diﬀerent research areas suggest that individuals and ﬁrms
utilize in practice social and individual learning methods similar to those we study. For example, in
industrial organization, Thornton and Thompson (2001) use a dataset on shipbuilding during WWII
to analyze learning across and within shipyards. They ﬁnd that learning spillovers are signiﬁcant in
their impact and may have contributed more to increases in productivity than conventional learning
by doing eﬀects. Cunningham (2004) uses data from semiconductor plants and ﬁnds that ﬁrms which
are installing signiﬁcantly new technologies appear to be inﬂuenced by social learning as predicted by
the Caplin and Leahy (1994) theoretical model. Singh, Youn and Tan (2006) ﬁnd similar eﬀects in
the open source software industry. In development, Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) use household panel
data from India on the adoption and proﬁtability of high-yield crop varieties to test the implications
of learning by doing and learning from others. They ﬁnd evidence that households’ own and their
neighbors’ experience increases proﬁtability. Conley and Udry (2005) investigate the role of social
learning in the diﬀusion of a new agricultural technology in Ghana2. They test whether farmers adjust
their inputs to align with those of their neighbors who were successful in previous periods and present
evidence that farmers do tend to adopt such successful practices. However, when they apply the same
model to a crop with a known technology they ﬁnd no such evidence.3 Finally, at the macro level, the
seminal work of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) have emphasized the role of learning spillovers as an
engine of economic growth.
1As an example, take a standard problem of optimal contracting under moral hazard. Applications corresponding to
this setting abound in the ﬁnance literature (credit under moral hazard), public ﬁnance (optimal taxation with hidden
labor eﬀort), development (sharecropping), macroeconomics (optimal social insurance), labor (optimal wage schedules),
etc.
2Zhang, Fan and Cai (2002) also present evidence for learning from others in technology adoption using household and
GIS data from rural India.
3Related evidence exists in the business and management literature as well. For instance, Boyd and Bresser (2004)
study the occurrence and performance eﬀects of diﬀerent models of organizational learning in the U.S. retail industry and
point out the importance of inter-organizational learning while Ryu, Rao, Kim and Chaudhury (2005) document learning
by doing and learning from others in the Internet data management industry.
2For simplicity, we adopt a repeated one-period contracting framework in an output-sharing model
which can be thought of as optimal wage, sharecropping, or equity ﬁnancing arrangement. An asset
owner (the principal) contracts with an agent to produce jointly. The principal supplies the asset (e.g.
a machine, land, etc.) while the agent supplies unobservable labor eﬀort. Output is stochastic and the
probability of a given output realization depends on the agent’s eﬀort. The principal wants to design
and implement an optimal compensation scheme for the agent which maximizes the principal’s proﬁts
and satisﬁes participation and incentive compatibility constraints for the agent.
We ﬁrst describe the optimal contract that arises if the contracting parties are fully rational and
know all the ingredients of the contracting problem and the environment i.e. the technology and
preferences. Then, we build a model in which a principal with no prior knowledge of the environment
has to learn what the optimal contract is. Agents remain fully rational.4
We implement the social learning paradigm (learning from others) using a model of social evolu-
tionary learning (SEL) where players update their strategies based on imitating strategies of those
players who have performed better in the past, and occasionally experiment with new strategies. The
population of players thus learns jointly through experience that they share over time.5
For our implementation of the individual learning paradigm (learning by doing), we evaluate three
classes of individual learning, namely Reinforcement Learning, RL (Roth and Erev, 1995, 1998),
Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning, EWA (Camerer and Ho, 1999), and Individual Evolutionary
Learning, IEL (Arifovic and Ledyard, 2004, 2007).6 In contrast to social learning, individual learning
is based on updating the entire collection of strategies that belong to an individual player, based on
her own experience only7. The feature shared by all the algorithms we study is that the frequency of
representation of well performing strategies increases over time and the choice of a particular strategy
to be used in a given period is probabilistic.
In terms of payoﬀ evaluation, the diﬀerence between RL on one hand, and IEL and EWA, on the
other, is that RL updates the payoﬀ only of the strategy that was played in a given time period, and
leaves the payoﬀs of the rest of the strategies unchanged. In contrast, EWA and IEL update the payoﬀs
of all strategies in any given period based on calculations of ‘foregone’ payoﬀs. In terms of strategy
representation, what distinguishes RL and EWA from IEL is that the implementation of RL and EWA
requires representation of the entire strategy set in the algorithms’ collections, while IEL starts out with
a collection (i.e. a subset) of strategies that are randomly drawn from the full set. Finally, in terms
of the updating process, RL and EWA use a procedure that is standard for a number of individual
learning algorithms, i.e. the probabilities that strategies will be selected are updated based on their
accumulated payoﬀs while IEL’s updating is instead based on the evolutionary paradigm.
Our main result shows that SEL almost always converges to the theoretically optimal principal-
agent contract. In contrast, individual learning algorithms based on evaluation of foregone payoﬀs( I E L
and EWA) that have proven successful in a variety of Nash type environments completely fail to adapt
in our setting. RL performs somewhat better than IEL and EWA since it only updates the payoﬀso f
4We are currently working on modeling an environment where both principal and agent are learning.
5In papers related to ours, evolutionary learning algorithms such as genetic algorithms, classiﬁer systems, genetic
programming, evolutionary programming, etc. have been widely used in numerous applications (see Arifovic, 2000 for a
survey of applications in macroeconomics; LeBaron et al., 1999 for applications in ﬁnance; and Dawid, 1999 for a general
overview). Also, in organization theory, Rose and Willemain (1996) implement a genetic algorithm in a principal-agent
environment where the principal’s and agent’s strategies are represented by ﬁnite automata. They ﬁnd that the variance
of output and agent’s risk aversion matter for convergence. However, they do not analyze the relative performance of
diﬀerent learning algorithms or study the reasons for non-convergence.
6The ﬁrst two have been used mainly in relation to experimental data from two-person games. The third has been
implemented in public good and market environments with larger strategy spaces.
7For economic applications see Arifovic, 1994; Marimon, McGrattan, and Sargent, 1990; Vriend, 2000.
3those strategies that were actually used. However, RL’s overall learning performance is not satisfactory
due to its disadvantage in handling large strategy spaces.
The intuition for the failure of EWA and IEL is that, when evaluating foregone payoﬀs of potential
strategies that have not been tried, the principal assumes that agent’s action will remain constant (as
if playing Nash) while in fact the optimal contract involves an optimal response to the agent’s best
response function as in a Stackelberg game. The inability of individual learning to produce correct
foregone payoﬀs for the principal’s strategies precludes its convergence to the theoretically optimal
contract8. In contrast, SEL involves evaluation of payoﬀs of the strategies that are actually played,
thus circumventing the problem. As a result, SEL exhibits high rates of convergence to the optimal
contract.
Two additional reasons speciﬁc to our principal-agent setting cause further diﬃculties in convergence
to the optimal contract, independently of which learning algorithm is implemented. First, the presence
of stochastic shocks makes learning diﬃcult in any type of environment. Second, in our model, payoﬀs
are a discontinuous function of the strategy space at the agent’s participation constraint. This creates
problems for the successful adaptation of all learning algorithms since their performance is driven by
the diﬀerences in payoﬀs that strategies receive over time.
The failure of individual learning where foregone payoﬀs are taken into account is in stark contrast
to the ﬁndings reported in the existing literature.9 However, as mentioned above, our principal-agent
environment is diﬀerent from the environments that have been studied so far, most importantly in its
sequential rather than simultaneous game nature. To address this issue, we study a modiﬁed version
of the IEL algorithm where only payoﬀs of strategies that are actually tried out are updated. At the
same time we keep the basic evolutionary updating process that has enabled IEL to adapt well in other
environments with large strategy space. The resulting IEL algorithm with realized payoﬀs( I E L R )
proved more successful in converging to the optimal contract than its canonical counterpart. However,
its convergence rates still fall short of those achieved under social learning.
2 Contracting under Full Rationality
2.1 The Optimal Contract
This section describes the optimal contracting problem that we study. Consider an output sharing
model, for instance, the standard moral hazard model of sharecropping (e.g. Stiglitz, 1974). Alternative
applications include proﬁt sharing under franchising, licensing, or author-publishing contracts. To ﬁx
ideas, we can interpret the principal as a landlord and the agent as a tenant working on the land.
Output is given by y(z)=z + ε where z is the eﬀo r te m p l o y e db yt h ea g e n ta n dε is a normally
distributed random shock with mean 0 and variance σ2.E ﬀort is unobservable/ non-contractible.
Output is publicly observable. Assume that the range of possible eﬀorts is such that the landlord
cannot infer from the output realization what eﬀort level was employed. The principal is risk neutral
while the agent is risk averse with utility from consumption u(c) and a cost of eﬀort v(z). The agent’s
outside option is ¯ u.
We restrict attention to linear compensation contracts as in Stiglitz (1974), i.e. the principal receives
π(y) ≡ (1 − s)y + f and the agent receives c(y) ≡ sy − f where s ∈ [0,1] is the output share of the
8Note also that another commonly studied learning algorithm, ﬁctitious play (see Fudenberg and Levine, 1998) would
suﬀer from the same problem as it also uses foregone payoﬀs.
9Various studies (see, for example, Camerer and Ho, 1999; Camerer, 2003; Arifovic and Ledyard, 2004, 2007) ﬁnd that
the performance of these models, when evaluated against evidence from experiments with human subjects, is superior to
the performance of learning models where only actual strategy payoﬀs are taken into account.
4agent and f is a ﬁxed payment/rent. We are aware that, in general (e.g. see Holmstrom, 1979), the
theoretically optimal compensation contract may be non-linear. There are two possible justiﬁcations
for restricting our analysis to linear compensation schemes. The ﬁrst is computational - given that
this paper is about modeling learning about the best compensation contract, the linearity restriction
transforms the problem into learning about two scalars, s and f, as opposed to learning about a general
compensation function c(y) which could make the problem both analytically intractable and much
harder for agents to learn. The second justiﬁcation is the observation that in reality output sharing
agreements very often take the linear form, e.g. see Chao (1983) on sharecropping or Lafontaine (1992),
Sen (1993) on franchising10. Clearly, our methods can be extended to more complicated schemes as
long as the strategy space remains tractable.
The optimal contract can be found as a solution to a principal-agent mechanism design problem.
The principal’s objective is to maximize his expected proﬁt subject to participation and incentive
compatibility constraints for the agent:
max
s,f
(1 − s)z + f
subject to:
z =a r gm a x
ˆ z
Eu(y(ˆ z) − f) − v(ˆ z) (1)
Eu(sy(z) − f) − v(z) ≥ ¯ u (2)
The ﬁrst constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) stating that the chosen eﬀort
must be optimal for the agent given the proposed compensation scheme (s,f). The second constraint
is the participation constraint (PC) stating that the agent must obtain expected utility higher than
his outside option ¯ u in order to accept the contract. We assume that ¯ u is large enough so that the
participation constraint is binding at the optimum.
Under our assumptions about the relationship between eﬀort and output and the distribution of ε,
it is easy to verify that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (Rogerson, 1985) holds. Hence, we
can replace the incentive compatibility constraint (1) with its ﬁrst order condition:
sEu0(s(z + ε)) = v0(z) (3)
and solve for the optimal contract (s∗,f∗) from (3) and (2).
2.2 A Computable Example
We use the following easily computable example in our numerical analysis of learning in the principal-
agent model. Assume a mean-variance utility for the tenant: Eu(c) ≡ E(c) −
γ
2Va r(c) and cost of
eﬀort v(z)=1
2z2. The tenant’s utility is thus:







The ICC, (3) implies that, given the oﬀered share, s and ﬁxed payment, f the agent will optimally
choose eﬀort
z∗ = s
10There also exists a volume of literature trying to reconcile this observation with theory, e.g. see Arrow (1985) and
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987).
5The principal’s problem then becomes (substituting from the ICC and participation constraints):
max
s (1 − s)s +
1
2
s2(1 − γσ2) − ¯ u
The f.o.c. is:










(1 + γσ2)2 − ¯ u.
Our main objective is to examine the behavior of the above model under learning. We assume that
the stage contract is repeated over time. The main reason for this is numerical and in future work
we plan to investigate learning in multi-period dynamic settings. In general, contract theory suggests
(e.g. Townsend, 1982) that in a dynamic framework, intertemporal tie-ins would typically exist in
the optimal contract. However, if standard learning algorithms cannot converge to the optimal static
contract then we would expect them to be even less successful in the full dynamic setting.
We want to examine how hard or easy it is for boundedly rational players to learn what the optimal
contract looks like. Speciﬁcally, as a ﬁrst pass we assume that the principal is not endowed either with
the ability to optimize or with the knowledge of the physical environment, i.e., she does not know what
the agent’s preferences and the exogenous stochastic shock properties are. In contrast, as explained in
the introduction, agents are assumed to be able to ﬁnd out their optimal eﬀort choice, z∗ given the
messages about the share, s, and the rent, f, that they receive from the principals.
The learning proceeds as follows. Each period the principal oﬀers a contract st,f t, then the agent
chooses eﬀort, output is realized, and the principal’s proﬁt is computed. If the oﬀered contract does
not satisfy the participation constraint, we assume that the principal gets a payoﬀ of ˜ π (set to zero in
the benchmark simulations) for the current period. After proﬁts are realized the principal updates her
strategy and chooses a new contract st+1,f t+1, etc.
3 Learning about the Optimal Contract
We investigate two learning paradigms. The ﬁrst is commonly known as social learning where bound-
edly rational players can learn from each others’ experience. In our setting, this translates into a
learning model where principals are given an opportunity to observe the behavior of some of the other
principals’ and update their strategies (i.e. the contracts they oﬀer) accordingly. Our model of social
learning is based on the evolutionary paradigm where the principals’ success and survival is based on
how successful their strategies, (s,f) are, and on occasional experimentation with new strategies.
The second learning paradigm we study is individual learning where principals learn only from their
own experience. Speciﬁcally, each principal is endowed with a collection of diﬀerent strategies that she
updates over time based on her experience. As explained above, we examine the behavior of three
baseline models of individual learning that share some common features: reinforcement leaning (RL) -
Roth and Erev (1995); experience-weighted attraction learning, (EWA) - Camerer and Ho (1999); and
individual evolutionary learning (IEL) - Arifovic and Ledyard (2004, 2007).
63.1 Common Structure of the Learning Algorithms
In each of the learning models that we consider all agents are identical and optimize each time period
given the contract proposed by the principal. A strategy/message11, mi
t, that is in the strategy set Mt
at time t ∈ {1,T 0} consists of a share/rent pair, i.e. mi
t = {si
t,fi
t}. The strategy set Mt of ﬁxed size N
has elements mi
t belonging to the strategy space, G, which is a two-dimensional grid of size #S × #F
where S and F are linearly-spaced grids12 for the share, s, and the rent, f. The coarseness of the S
and F grids is given by the parameter d, which determines the number of points on the grid. Each
point in G thus represents a strategy/contract consisting of a share-rent pair.
In case of social learning, the number of principals is equal to the number of strategies, N.T h u s ,
each principal, i ∈ {1,N} has strategy mi
t t h a ts h eu s e sa tt i m et. However, in case of individual
learning, Mt is a collection of strategies of size N that belong to a single principal. At each t,t h e
principal chooses one of them that she uses as her actual strategy.
Each period t consists of T1 ≥ 1 ‘interactions’ between a ﬁxed principal-agent pair where each
interaction13 corresponds to a separate output shock (ε draw). Every period, t, the principal announces
a single message/contract, i.e. a share-rent pair (st,f t) ∈ Mt. Given the announced contract, the agent
provides the optimal level of eﬀort which in our model is equal to the share that was oﬀered, i.e. z∗
t = st.
Output for each within-period interaction, ys, s =1 ,..T 1,i st h e ng i v e nb y :
ys,t = st +  s,t
where  s,t is normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2. The principal thus collects proﬁt
πs,t = ys,t(1 − st)+ft.
We assume that the principal uses the same strategy over T1 interactions. During this time, the
agent provides the same optimal eﬀort level, z∗
t while output and proﬁts vary since they depend on
the realization of the stochastic shock, εs. This is why we use subscripts s to denote output for each
individual interaction. At the end of T1 interactions, the value of the average output produced during
time period t is:






The average proﬁt/payoﬀ for period t is thus:
¯ πt =( 1− st)¯ yt + ft
This average payoﬀ represents the measure of performance of a particular strategy (st,f t).I nc a s et h a t
the proposed strategy does not satisfy the agent’s participation constraint, the average payoﬀ, ¯ πt is set
equal to zero.
11We will use the terms message, strategy or contract interchangeably.
12In principle, we could use continuous sets for s and f for implementation of SEL and IEL algorithms. However, since
we also want to evaluate the performance of the RL and EWA algorithms, which can be implemented using discretized
strategy space only, we choose discrete grids for consistency. We perform robustness checks with respect to the grid
density.
13The function of these within-period interactions between a principal-agent pair is to allow the principal time to learn
about the expected proﬁts that can be generated from a given contract. We provide comparative statics with respect to
T1 at the end of the paper.
73.2 Social Learning
In the social learning framework, learning operates on the population scale. There are N principal-agent
pairs, i.e. the number of strategies in Mt at any point of time is equal to the number of principals or, in
other words, each principal is represented by a single strategy. The learning process proceeds following
the general form described above. Below we describe the speciﬁcs related to our implementation of
social evolutionary learning (SEL) as representing the idea of learning from others. Learning takes
place between periods.
The ﬁrst element of SEL algorithm is replication which allows for potentially better paying alterna-
tives to replace worse ones. It is used to generate a population of N replicates of the strategies that were
used in the population at period t. As our baseline operator, we use proportionate (“roulette wheel”)
replication. Speciﬁcally, a strategy mi
t , i ∈ {1,..N}, in the current strategy set has the following
probability of obtaining a replicate:
Pri






where λ is a parameter governing the relative ﬁtness weights. In addition to simple proportionate
replication, we also consider a selective proportionate replication. Under the selective proportionate
replication, a new strategy replaces a strategy that was previously implemented only if it yields a higher
average payoﬀ. If this is not the case, the principal keeps her previously implemented strategy. More
formally, the payoﬀ of each strategy m
j
t+1,j= {1,...,N} is compared to the payoﬀ of its corresponding
strategy m
j
t,j= {1,...,N},i . e .t h ejth member of the strategy collection at time t. The strategy at
location j that has a higher payoﬀ between the two, becomes the member of the set Mt+1 at t +1 .
Alternatively, as a robustness check we also implement another, commonly used replication operator,
tournament selection, in the following way. For i =1 ,...,N, mi
t+1 is chosen by picking two members





















After replication, experimentation takes place, each strategy/message mi
t+1 is subjected to exper-
imentation with probability μ. If experimentation takes place, the existing strategy, mi
t+1 is replaced
by a new message from G which is drawn from a square centered on mi
t+1 with sides of length 2rm.14
The updating process above describes the interaction of a population of principals who learn ‘collec-
tively’ through gathering information about the behavior of others and through imitation of previously
successful strategies. Those that yield above-average payoﬀst e n dt ob eu s e db ym o r ep r i n c i p a l si nt h e
following period. The experimentation incorporates innovations by principals, done either on purpose
or by chance.
3.3 Individual Learning
The individual learning paradigm is based on an individual’s learning and updating of strategies based
only on her own experience.15 In our setting this implies that each period the principal has a collection
14We also conducted simulations with selective experimentation whereby the new strategy is implemented only if it has
ah i g h e rp a y o ﬀ than the one it is replacing. This procedure, however, did not have a signiﬁcant impact on the performance
of our learning algorithms, and thus we do not discuss this variant any further.
15Unlike SEL, here we have in mind only one principal.
8of strategies that is used for her decision making process. Over time, as a result of accumulated
information about the performance of individual strategies, the updating results in the increase in the
frequency of well performing strategies in the principal’s collection. The choice of a particular strategy
as the actual strategy that the principal uses in a given period is probabilistic, and the strategies’
selection probabilities depend positively on their past performance.
All three individual learning models that we study, RL, EWA and IEL, have these common features
but also diﬀer in important ways. The main diﬀerences among the three algorithms are related to how
the pool of strategies is determined and how it is updated over time. These diﬀerences turn out to play
a ni m p o r t a n tr o l ei nt h er e s u l t st h a tw eo b t a i n .N e x t , we provide a detailed description of each of the
individual learning algorithms that we study.
3.3.1 Reinforcement Learning
We follow the implementation of Roth and Erev’s (1995) adjusted reinforcement learning (RL) algo-
rithm. In contrast to the SEL model, the strategy set, M, is the whole strategy space, i.e. the full grid
G = S ×R, i.e. all possible combinations of s and f. The number of strategies in Mt for each t is thus
equal to the number of grid points, i.e. for the RL model, N =# S × #R. A single principal chooses
one of the strategies from the set to play each period. Each strategy in M is assigned a propensity
of choice.16 The propensity of choice of a given strategy is updated in a given period t b a s e do nt h e
payoﬀ it earned if it was used at t, and is otherwise left at its previous level. In our implementation,
propensities of choice are given by their discounted payoﬀs.
Speciﬁcally, for each strategy mj in M,l e tI
j
t denote an indicator value for the principal’s strategy
in time period t,w h e r eI
j
t =1if mj is chosen in period t and I
j
t =0otherwise. Then, the discounted
payoﬀ of strategy j,a tt i m et, R
j


















where q ∈ [0,1] is a time/memory discount factor parameter and ¯ π
j
t is the average payoﬀ computed
over T1 interactions. At the beginning, each strategy’s payoﬀ, R
j
1 is set equal to 0.
Strategies are selected to be played based on their propensities. Those with higher propensities
have higher probabilities of being selected. At the end of each period t, the principal selects strategy











Once a strategy is selected, it undergoes experimentation with probability μ.I nc a s et h a te x p e r i -
mentation takes place, rather than announcing the initially selected strategy, e.g. ˜ m to the agent, the
principal announces a randomly drawn strategy from the square centered on ˜ m with sides of length
2rm. As in the SEL model, the chosen strategy is then implemented for T1 interactions during which
the agent responds with the (same) optimal eﬀort.
3.3.2 Experience Weighted Attraction Learning
Our second individual learning algorithm, EWA, is a generalization of the RL algorithm described
above. We follow Camerer and Ho (1999) to describe the version of EWA that we implement here. The
strategy space, M of size N =# S × #R is the same as that under RL, namely the complete grid G.
16In the initial period all strategies in G have equal probability of being selected.
9In EWA, a strategy that was actually used, denoted by ma
t, receives an actual evaluation of its
performance, while all other strategies in M receive evaluation of their foregone (or hypothetical)
performance. The hypothetical payoﬀ for a strategy mj ∈ M, mj 6= ma
t in period t is:
¯ π
j
t =( 1− sj)¯ yt(sa
t)+fj
where ¯ yt(sa
t) is the average output generated under strategy ma
t in period t. In the performance
evaluation process (see below) this foregone payoﬀ is weighted by a discount factor δ ∈ (0,1) reﬂecting
the fact that these strategies were not actually used.
At the end of each period, the so-called attractions (corresponding to the propensities of choice in
the RL model) of all strategies are updated. Speciﬁcally, in EWA there are two main variables that are
updated after each round of experience: Nt, the number of “observation-equivalents” of past experience
(called the experience weight); and A
j





0 can be interpreted as prior game experience and/or principal’s predictions.
T h ee x p e r i e n c ew e i g h t ,Nt, is updated according to
Nt = ρNt−1 +1 (8)
for any t ≥ 1,w h e r eρ is a depreciation rate or retrospective discount factor. The updated attraction













The parameter δ determines the extent to which hypothetical evaluations are used in computing at-
tractions. If δ =0 , then no hypotheticals are used, just as in the RL model. If δ =1 , hypothetical
evaluations are fully weighted. The parameter φ is another discount factor or decay rate, which
depreciates the previous attraction and is similar to the parameter q in the RL model. In fact, if
φ = q,δ =0 ,ρ=0 , and N0 =0then the EWA model is equivalent to the RL model. Finally, just as











3.3.3 Individual Evolutionary Learning
Our third individual learning algorithm, IEL, shares some common features with RL and EWA. First,
like in both the RL and EWA, the choice of the principal’s strategy is probabilistic. Also, the selection
probabilities are based on a strategy’s hypothetical (foregone) payoﬀs like in EWA learning. However,
there is an important diﬀerence. In the IEL model, the set of active strategies is not the complete
grid G but instead changes over time (as in SEL) in response to experience and occasionally, to pure
random events (experimentation).
Speciﬁcally, as in the SEL algorithm, at time t =1 ,as e to fN ≥ 1 strategies, M1 is chosen from
the grid G randomly. In contrast to SEL, these strategies do not pertain to N diﬀerent principals but
instead become the single principal’s strategy collection at time t =1 . Over time, the principal always
keeps N active strategies. Suppose that at the beginning of round t, the principal’ collection of active
strategies is Mt ⊂ G. One of these strategies, ma
t ∈ Mt is selected as the actual strategy to be played
during t, that is, it is implemented over T1 interactions.
10Similar to EWA learning, the payoﬀs of all other (inactive) strategies in the set Mt (but not in
G) are updated as well. Their payoﬀs (averaged over the T1 interactions) are computed by taking as
given the optimal agent’s eﬀort response to ma
t, strategy that was actually used at t.D e n o t et h i se ﬀort
response by z∗(ma
t)=sa
t. Then, the hypothetical payoﬀ for a strategy m
j
t 6= ma
t in period t is:
¯ π
j







t) is the average output generated under strategy ma
t.
Once the hypothetical payoﬀs are computed, the updating of the principal’s collection of strategies
takes place applying replication and experimentation (as in SEL). Replication reinforces strategies based
on their actual and hypothetical payoﬀs and generates a population of N replicates of the strategies
that were used at time period t. Again, as our baseline operator, we use proportionate (”roulette
wheel”) replication. Thus, each strategy has the following probability of obtaining a replicate:
Pr
j








Again, for robustness check, we implement selective replication and tournament selection as well.
After replication, experimentation takes place. It works in the same way as in the SEL model. The
application of replication and experimentation results in the next period’s strategy set Mt+1. Finally,
as in SEL, given Mt+1, the selection probabilities of the strategies in Mt+1 are computed (using again
equation 10).
3.3.4 Modiﬁed IEL Model with Realized Payoﬀs
Finally, we describe a modiﬁed model of individual evolutionary learning that we decided to study in
light of the unsatisfactory convergence performance (see section 5) of the canonical IEL algorithm with
foregone payoﬀs. The modiﬁed model diﬀers from the standard IEL described above in that only the
payoﬀs of those strategies that were actually played are updated. In this respect, the modiﬁed algorithm
is the same as reinforcement learning. We call this algorithm I E Lw i t hr e a l i z e dp a y o ﬀs( I E L R ) .Apart
from the elimination of hypothetical evaluations, we keep all other features of the standard IEL model,
i.e. we use replication to change the frequency with which diﬀerent strategies are represented in the
collection, and experimentation to draw ‘new’ strategies from our strategy space. Overall, the IELR
model is thus a hybrid between the RL and the standard IEL model.
4 Computational Implementation of the Learning Algorithms
This section describes the computational procedures we followed to initialize and implement the learning
algorithms in our setting. The next section contains the simulation results obtained from a wide set of
parametrizations and numerous robustness checks.17
In order to obtain representative results we perform 7,350 diﬀerent runs for each learning regime.
These runs diﬀer in the parameter values for γ and σ from the structural model and the random
generator seed used to draw the initial pool of strategies, i.e. each run corresponds to a unique
combination (γ,σ,seed). The values for γ and σ that we use are exhibited in table 1 below. The
agent’s reservation utility is set to ¯ u =0 .
17The MATLAB code for all the simulations reported in this paper is available from the authors upon request.
11The strategy space, G , from which strategies are chosen is composed of all (st,f t) pairs belonging
to the two-dimensional grid such that st belongs to an equally spaced linear grid on the interval [0,1]
and ft belongs to an equally spaced linear grid on the interval [fmin,f max]=[ −0.05,0.5]. The strategy
space dimensions were chosen to ensure that the optimal contract (s∗,f∗) is always inside G for each
possible γ and σ we use. The strategy space G is discretized in both dimensions with distance, d,
between neighboring points.
In the SEL and IEL models, N messages are randomly chosen from G at t =1and assigned an
initial ﬁtness (payoﬀ) of zero. Under RL and EWA all possible strategies in G are initially assigned
zero ﬁtness. Each run continues for T0 =2 ,400 periods. At period ˆ T =2 ,000 the experimentation
rate, μ (constant until then) is let to decay exponentially.18
The benchmark values for all parameters used in the computations are described in the table below:
Table 1 - Benchmark Parameter Values
Parameter Values Used
risk aversion, γ 15 linearly spaced points on [0.2, 3]
output variance, σ 7 linearly spaced points on [0, 0.6]
random seeds 70 random integers on [1, 10,000]
strategy pool size (SEL/IEL), N 30
run length, T0 2,400
output draws per period, T1 10
experimentation rate, μ 0.05
experimentation decay factor, χ 0.9998
experimentation radius, rm 0.1
weighting factor, λ 1
grid density, d 0.01
EWA parameters, δ, ρ, φ δ =0 .2,ρ=0 .8,φ=0 .8
RL discount parameter19 1
In the results section next we also perform numerous robustness and comparative statics runs
varying the above parameters.
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5.1 Benchmark Runs
We begin by reporting the results from our benchmark social and individual learning runs. In order to
present our results, we deﬁne and examine the behavior of a number of diﬀerent measures that reﬂect
both qualitative and quantitative aspects of the learning dynamics. These measures include:
• the frequency distribution over all simulations of the diﬀerences between simulated and optimal
payoﬀso fa l ls t r a t e g i e si nt h eﬁnal period
• the frequency distribution over all simulations of the diﬀerences (in Euclidean distance) between
simulated and optimal strategies in the ﬁnal period
18We use the following formula: μt = μt−10.998
t− ˆ T where t is the current simulation period.
19We also tried a discount factor q = .9 but this value resulted in worse performance than the baseline.
12• the time paths of the fraction of simulated strategies/payoﬀs within a given distance from the
optimum. Here, each point on the time path equals the average fraction over all of the strategies
of the 7,350 runs. Two “distance” criteria are considered: 0 and 0.05
• strategy time paths generated by the diﬀerent learning models for a sample run.
Table 2 characterizes the performance of our four benchmark learning algorithms. The table con-
tains two alternative measures of performance, namely the percentages of last period (t =2 ,400)
strategies in the strategy pool and their payoﬀs (averaged over all 7,350 runs) that are within a given
“distance” from the optimal contract, or its payoﬀ (which is computed in percentage terms). The
distance to the optimal payoﬀ (rather than that in strategy space) is more relevant from an economic
point of view given that the objective of the principal is to maximize proﬁts rather than to get as close
to the optimal contract as possible (although these two measures are clearly related).
It is evident that our SEL algorithm with baseline replication has a hard time learning what the
optimal strategy is. With the ‘exact convergence to the optimum criterion’ is used, only 1.65% of
all last period messages in the pool coincide with the optimal contract (s∗,f∗). If the performance
criterion is relaxed to allow for convergence within 0.1 Euclidean distance from the optimal contract
(or, alternatively, within 10% of the optimal payoﬀ), the benchmark SEL algorithm shows better
performance with 67.8% of all messages in the ﬁnal pool over all runs ending within 10% of the optimal
payoﬀ.
However, our results indicate that our benchmark individual learning algorithms have no ability to
adapt in the principal-agent environment. The performance of RL and EWA improves negligibly when
the performance criteria are relaxed, with RL doing slightly better than EWA. The three individual
learning algorithms show little improvement even under this relaxed performance criterion. Worth
noting is a poor performance of the standard IEL algorithm that otherwise performs much better than
RL and EWA in the environments with large strategy space.
Figures 1 and 2 complement table 2 by visualizing the algorithms’ performance. In ﬁgure 1, which
displays the histograms of the diﬀerences between simulated and optimal payoﬀs and strategies, we see
that only the SEL model sometimes gets anywhere close to the optimal strategy and payoﬀ.F i g u r e2
shows the time paths of the actually realized share, s, and fee, f, for a given sample run under each of
the four learning regimes. The ﬁgures clearly illustrate the diﬃculties with convergence to the optimal
contract in our principal-agent setting.
Discussion
There are three important factors that are responsible for the poor performance of our benchmark
learning algorithms. First, and common to all of the algorithms, is the fact that in our problem, the
payoﬀs are a discontinuous function of the message space at the participation constraint. Figure 3
which is drawn for a sample parameter conﬁguration illustrates this point clearly. All strategies above
the participation constraint, which is given by the parabola-shaped solid line deﬁned by f =
s2(1−γσ2)
2 ,
receive zero payoﬀ since no contract materializes between the principal and the agent if this constraint
is violated. On the other hand, the optimal contract (s∗,f∗), denoted by a black diamond on the ﬁgure,
lies on the participation constraint. Thus, small deviations away from the optimal contract that enter
the zero-payoﬀ area above the parabola lead to a large discontinuous drop in payoﬀs. This aﬀects the
performance of all the algorithms and slows or even prevents convergence. In addition, as evident from
ﬁgure 3 where we also plot the iso-payoﬀ lines for a typical case, the principal’s payoﬀsd e c r e a s eq u i t e
steeply away from the participation constraint while they stay quite high near the constraint even for
those (s,f) contracts that are far away from the optimal strategy.
13Replication can thus result in increasing the number of instances of strategies that have relatively
high payoﬀs but are far away from the optimal contract, while even the smallest amount of experimen-
tation can take a strategy “oﬀ the cliﬀ”, to the right, into the area of much lower payoﬀs, and to the
left, into the area of zero payoﬀs.
A related issue with the strategy space aﬀects the RL and EWA updating methods where all the
points in the strategy grid G belong to the principal’s strategy pool. In our benchmark simulations this
number of points is quite high (over 5,000) which contributes additionally to the poor performance of
the two algorithms. A decrease in the grid density improves their performance somewhat (see section
5.3).
A second, very important factor causes the poor performance of the IEL and EWA algorithms,
namely the fact that they both rely on hypothetical (foregone) payoﬀ evaluation as explained in section
3.3. That is, strategies in the pool that have not been played receive payoﬀ updates together with the
actual contract oﬀered to the agent. The problem here is that the hypothetical payoﬀs are computed
as the foregone proﬁts that the principal would have obtained if they had played some alternative
strategy (˜ s, ˜ f). However, the eﬀort, through the currently observed output realization, ¯ y,t h a ti su s e d
in this computation is the eﬀort that is the optimal response for the contract that was actually played.
This is the key to understanding the failure of the EWA and IEL algorithms based on the foregone
payoﬀ evaluation in our setting. The reason is that, if in fact the agent is oﬀered a diﬀerent ˜ s, she
will change her behavior, and expected output will not be the original ¯ y anymore. Thus, all assigned
hypothetical payoﬀs are incorrect which dooms any algorithm using the foregone payoﬀs’ approach.
Note that this is a general point that would apply to any economic model where the underlying game is
sequential (Stackelberg) i.e. where one party moves ﬁrst and then the other party reacts. In contrast, in
simultaneous (Nash) games, evaluating hypothetical payoﬀs in the way assumed by the IEL algorithm
is not subject to this problem since the equilibrium is deﬁned by ﬁnding the best response given (i.e.
holding ﬁxed) the other party’s choice.
T h ep r o b l e mw i t ht h eh y p o t h e t i c a lp a y o ﬀs is illustrated in the following IEL example. Suppose
σ2 =0and that the principal oﬀers the contract (st,f t) with both components strictly positive. Then
she receives the signal yt = st > 0. Among all the strategies in the current pool, the one that makes
principal’s proﬁts, πt, largest while satisfying the participation constraint is assigned the highest payoﬀ.




2 , so we have πt ≤ yt(1 − st)+
s2
t
2 . The IEL hypothetical payoﬀ evaluation scheme assumes
(incorrectly) that the agent’s behavior (i.e. zt and therefore yt) stays the same, so πt is a quadratic
function with maximum achieved at a corner solution, i.e. s =0or s =1 . In particular, if yt > 1/2, the
strategy in the pool that is “closest” to (0, 0) receives the highest payoﬀ,w h i l ei fyt < 1/2, the strategy
in the pool closest to (1, 0.5) achieves the highest payoﬀ. Suppose the former situation has occurred.
Then, after replication, the pool at t +1will be biased towards contracts close to the point (0, 0) in
G. If st+1 < 1/2, which is likely given the previous period’s replication, then at t +1the strategies
closer to (1, 0.5) are now favored.20 This process cycles over time and which corner strategy survives
the replication and experimentation is up to chance. Clearly, convergence to the optimum under these
conditions can occur only under very special circumstances.
A ﬁnal factor explaining our benchmark results and common to all models of social and individual
learning, is that our model features learning in a stochastic environment. It is well-known from ex-
periments with various learning models21 that convergence to equilibria in stochastic settings is often
20Note that this discussion assumes that the principal is able to learn the participation constraint.
21For example, Lettau (1997) shows how agents who learn via genetic algorithms, in a social learning setting, hold
too much risk as compared to the optimal portfolio of rational investors. Lettau and Uhlig (1999) demonstrate a ‘good
14diﬃcult and might depend on the parameters of both the learning algorithm and the underlying eco-
nomic model. The main reason is that these algorithms require that the assessment of strategy payoﬀs
(which drives the selection and reinforcement process) be quite accurate. In our benchmark runs, the
principal observes T1 =1 0output draws on which a strategy’s payoﬀ is based. In the robustness
section 5.3 below we show that increasing this “evaluation window” does help improve convergence to
the optimum, conﬁrming this intuition.
5.2 Simulations with Modiﬁed Evolutionary Algorithms
We try to reduce negative eﬀects of replication on our SEL and IEL performance by implementing its
modiﬁed version: selective replication (described in section 3.) As mentioned earlier, variants of this
type of selection are standard in the applications of social evolutionary learning. The basic idea is that
a new strategy, selected via proportionate replication, replaces the existing strategy only if it has a
higher payoﬀ.
We also modify our benchmark IEL algorithm in order to deal with the problem related to the
hypothetical payoﬀ evaluation by adopting a method for evaluating strategies that is more similar to
RL, i.e. where only strategies that were actually selected for play have their payoﬀse v a l u a t e d . 22 We
call this model I E Lw i t hr e a l i z e dp a y o ﬀs (IELR).
Note that the same modiﬁcation of EWA would reduce it to a version of the RL algorithm whose
performance has already been evaluated. With the IELR version of the algorithm, our objective is
to examine whether good features of the evolutionary updating process, which have proven useful in
handling large strategy spaces, combined with realized rather than hypothetical payoﬀs evaluation,
facilitate individual evolutionary learning in the principal-agent environment.
The performance of the modiﬁed social and individual evolutionary learning algorithms is displayed
in table 3. Selective replication improves dramatically the performance of the SEL algorithm - now
73.5% (versus only 1.6% in the benchmark) of the strategies in the ﬁnal pool over all 7,350 simulations
coincide exactly with the optimal contract and virtually 100% of them come to within 5% of the
maximum possible proﬁt compared to only 37% in the baseline replication benchmark. We show
this improvement in performance in ﬁgure 4 which displays the histograms of the diﬀerences between
simulated and optimal payoﬀs and strategies for the modiﬁed algorithms. Note that a much larger
fraction of the diﬀerences is now close to zero (compare with ﬁgure 1). Similar improvement can be
seen in the time paths of fractions of strategies equal to or within 5% of the optimal strategies shown
in ﬁgure 5. Note that the percentage of strategies coinciding with the optimum in the modiﬁed SEL
(the top panels) increases fast over time with about 90% of them getting within 5% of the optimal
proﬁtb yp e r i o d3 0 0 .
Now let us look at the performance of the IELR algorithm. Table 3 as well as ﬁgures 4 and 5 report
the improvement in performance under both baseline and selective replication relative to the baseline
IEL model with hypothetical payoﬀs. We see that signiﬁcant gains in performance result from both
modiﬁcations (selective replication and evaluation of realized payoﬀs only), although ultimately the
IELR’s performance still remains worse than that of the SEL algorithm. Speciﬁcally, the IELR has
respectively 30% and 59% of ﬁnal pool strategies within 5% and 10% of the optimal proﬁts compared to
0% under hypothetical payoﬀs. These numbers rise to 81% and 92% when selective replication is also
applied. These are fairly good results in terms of performance. Notice that selective replication alone
state’ bias of the decision rules that are updated with an algorithm that combines elements of reinforcement learning and
replicator dynamics.
22We keep the rest of the updating process (i.e. replication and experimentation) as in the standard IEL since it has
proven successful with dealing with the large strategy space.
15does not help the performance of the algorithm (line 2 in the table). These results are also illustrated
in ﬁgure 6 where we display the strategy time paths for a sample run23.
Looking at ﬁgure 5, we see a jump in convergence around period 2,000 where the experimentation
rate starts decaying. This happens because any diversity in the strategy pool disappears since exper-
imentation is no longer possible. The “jump” is much larger in the IEL case as new mutants there
(entering with a payoﬀ of zero) can survive quite long in the pool without being played and hence
without being updated. Once the experimentation rate decays to zero these strategies disappear from
the pool and thus the fraction of strategies in the pool equal or within some distance of the optimum
increases.
Overall, as in the benchmark results, we ﬁnd that principals using the SEL algorithm (especially
when allowing for a more sophisticated replication operator) are better able to learn the optimal
contract in our environment. Individual evolutionary learning with realized payoﬀ evaluation shows
promise but still performs signiﬁcantly worse than social evolutionary learning. One candidate reason
for this under-performance seems the fact that, under SEL, all strategies in the strategy pool are
e v a l u a t e di ne a c hp e r i o dw i t ht h e i ra c t u a lp a y o ﬀs. In contrast, IELR updates only one strategy at a
time (the actual contract oﬀered to the agent) which seems to put the individual learning algorithm at
disadvantage. In section 6 we provide more details and a formal analysis on this non-convergence issue
showing that the SEL algorithm still performs better even controlling for total the number of strategies
evaluated.
5.3 Robustness Runs
In this section we report the results from various additional simulations we ran to investigate the robust-
ness of the performance of the learning algorithms to various changes in the parameters. Speciﬁcally,
we study the eﬀect of increasing the strategy pool size, N; increasing the number of evaluation runs,
T1; varying the payoﬀ weighting parameter, λ; varying the experimentation rate, μ;v a r y i n gt h es c o p e
of the experimentation governed by rm; varying the grid spacing, d for EWA and RL; using tournament
selection in the replication process; and varying the timing of experimentation decay24 All robustness
runs were performed for the same set of 7,350 parametrizations as before. The results are displayed
in table 4. Also, most of the robustness runs we report apply to the individual learning algorithm
since SEL performs very well already in the benchmark once selective replication is allowed. The main
ﬁndings are as follows:
1. Varying the strategy pool size, N
We ﬁnd that increasing the pool size, N to 100 (from 30 in the benchmark) improves convergence in
the modiﬁed SEL algorithm - the percentage of strategies coinciding with the optimum rises from 73.5
to 89.7. The intuition is that, with more principals in the strategy pool, learning occurs faster as more
strategies can be evaluated each period. The results for IEL with realized payoﬀsa r eq u i t ed i ﬀerent,
however. Both increasing N to 100 and decreasing it to 10 generate slight drop-oﬀ in performance from
the N =3 0benchmark with the fraction of strategies achieving the optimum going down from 32% to
27-28%. The reason for the diﬀerence with SEL results is that, with realized payoﬀs, the change in N
does not aﬀect the number of strategies’ payoﬀs that are updated each period. On one hand, lower N
can be potentially beneﬁcial given that smaller number of strategies will have zero payoﬀsi nt h ep o o l
but on the other hand, it has a disadvantage of not allowing for enough diversity in the pool which is
23The same run (i.e. same γ,σ and seed) was used for all the learning models.
24Due to space constraints, we omit reporting a large number of additional robustness checks that we performed. The
results are available upon request.
16especially important in the early stages of the learning process. In general, there will be some optimal
pool size that maximizes the algorithm performance.
2. Varying the number of within-period output evaluations, T1
Table 4 shows that increasing the number of output realizations, T1, that the principal observes
and uses to compute her payoﬀ from 10 to 100 improves the performance of both the SEL and IEL
algorithms. In the SEL case the percentage of strategies achieving the optimal contract rises from
73.5 to 88.8, while in the IELR case the corresponding increase is even more signiﬁcant (from 32% to
51.8%). Notice that the IELR with T1 =1 0 0comes within 10% of the optimal payoﬀ in 99% of all
cases. (Increasing T1 to 100, improves performance of IELR with N =1 0compared to the case with
N =1 0 ,a n dT1 =1 0 .)
As expected from the pool size results, an increase in the length of the evaluation window, T1
combined with a decrease in N to 10 in the IEL case results in better performance than the baseline
IELR with selective replication but worse performance than increasing T1 alone.
3. Varying the experimentation parameters, μ, rm and decay timing
In this robustness run we explore the sensitivity of the modiﬁed IEL algorithm to variations in
the parameters governing the experimentation operator. Decreasing the experimentation rate from 5%
to 2%, motivated by the idea that this will decrease the number of new strategies with zero payoﬀs
in the strategy pool, leads to insigniﬁcant changes in the performance of the algorithm. We also
experimented with reducing the value of the experimentation parameter, rm. The motivation behind
this exercise is that after the initial adjustment, the algorithm leads to a strategy pool settled in the
area around the optimal contract. At this point, shrinking the strategy space region within which
experimentation occurs can be beneﬁcial for convergence. Indeed, we ﬁnd an increase of performance
of about 5 percentage points for strategies that result in the optimal payoﬀ, but a smaller increase
(about 1%) for strategies within 5% of the optimal payoﬀ. Finally, we studied the eﬀect of moving
forward the time period when experimentation starts decaying from t =2 ,000 (which is our benchmark
case) to t = 500. The eﬀect is reduction in performance of about 25-30% relative to the benchmark
values from table 3 as the principal has less time to learn about the optimal contract.
4. Tournament selection
We also check the robustness of our ﬁndings to using tournament vs. proportionate selection, as
our replication operator. As table 4 shows, replacing selective replication with tournament selection in
the SEL algorithm achieves very similar results in terms of performance - over all of the runs - 69%
of the strategies in the ﬁnal pool coincide with the optimum under tournament selection while the
corresponding number is 73.5% under selective replication. The results for the fractions of simulated
payoﬀs within 5% and 10% of the maximum are even closer with still over 99% of all strategies achieving
payoﬀs within 5% of the optimum. However, note that tournament selection signiﬁcantly outperforms
the baseline replication (see table 2).
We also look at the eﬀect of tournament selection on the IELR model. As in the SEL case,
tournament selection achieves better performance than the baseline roulette wheel replication but,
unlike in the SEL case, it performs much worse than our selective replication operator. The reason
for superior performance of selective replication is the following. New mutants and unplayed strategies
have zero payoﬀs. Such strategies are replicated less frequently with selective replication than with
tournament selection. This results in more successful adaptation with selective replication.
5. Other robustness checks - grid spacing, ﬁtness weights
We also re-did the 7,350 runs under RL and EWA learning, increasing the grid spacing parameter,
d from 0.01 to 0.1. This increase makes the grid on the strategy space G coarser. A coarser grid helps
17the RL and EWA algorithms achieve better performance than in the benchmark but they are still far
from being successful in converging to the optimal contract. Once again, the EWA algorithm performs
worse than RL due to the problem with hypothetical payoﬀs’ evaluation discussed above.
Finally, we experimented with increasing the parameter λ which governs the curvature in the
mapping between average proﬁts realized by the principals who are learning and the ﬁtness of the
strategies they are evaluating. The results from increasing λ from 1 to 3 show a slight deterioration
in performance (e.g. the percentage of last period strategies coinciding with the optimum declines
from 32% to 27%). Using the biased roulette wheel replication from (4), a higher λ implies a higher
probability of choosing a strategy with a high payoﬀ. This may be beneﬁcial later on when (or, if) we
are close to the optimum but may lead to the strategies in the pool being “stuck” far away from the
optimum in the early stages. The combination of these two eﬀects explains the observed outcome.
5.4 Convergence Analysis
We report the results of our convergence analysis of the best performing social and individual learning
models, i.e. SEL and IELR with selective replication in table 5. We deﬁne the following criterion for
convergence: we record the time period when the algorithm ﬁrst “hits” the optimum, i.e. the ﬁrst time
when the optimal strategy is played. Then, we continue the simulation for the next 200 periods and
report the frequencies on how often 90% of the strategies in the pool are within a given distance of the
optimum (0, 0.05 or 0.1).
SEL performs well according to this criterion. Once the learning process takes the strategy pool
close to the optimum, it stays there forever (e.g. see the sample runs in ﬁgure 6). In contrast,
as discussed in detail in section 6, the IELR algorithm does not exhibit similar behavior prior to a
suﬃcient decrease in the rate of experimentation (i.e. holds only after period 2,000). That is, in the
IELR simulations, we can often have instances when the optimal strategy shows up in the agent’s
strategy pool at some period only to be wiped out shortly after by an experimentation or replaced
with another strategy with a “lucky” output draw (especially likely if T1 is small). An example is
presented in ﬁgure 7 where we show the fractions of strategies within a given distance, 0, 0.05, and 0.1
from the optimal strategy for a sample IELR run. In the panel that shows the fraction of strategies
equal to the optimal, we can observe that, between periods 300 and 400, there is a substantial fraction
(around 40%) of the strategies that are equal to the optimal one. Again, between periods 1,200 and
1,400, a substantial fraction of the current strategies in the pool (around 30% on average) coincide
with the optimal strategy. However, shortly afterwards, these strategies disappear from the pool and
the fraction of optimal strategies remains equal to zero until the end of the simulation.
The above reasoning explains the ﬁndings reported in table 5 and suggests that the modiﬁed SEL
algorithm converges (in the sense deﬁned above) much faster than the IELR algorithm. For example, if
we use our ‘exactly at the optimum’ criterion, SEL is three times faster, and up to twenty times faster
according to our ‘within 10% of the optimal payoﬀ’ criterion. The percentage of simulations under
IELR converging exactly to the optimum measured by our “90% of strategies, 90% of time” criterion
is only 21% compared to 74% in the SEL case.
We also analyze the convergence rates as a function of the parameters γ and σ from our underlying
economic model. This is shown in ﬁgure 8, top panel for the SEL algorithm and bottom panel for the
IELR algorithm. The ﬁgure depicts the fraction (out of the 70 random seed runs for ﬁxed model para-
meters) of non-convergent (according to the above-deﬁned criterion) simulations for the diﬀerent values
of the risk aversion parameter, γ and the variance of output, σ that we use. Higher output variance, σ2
clearly hampers convergence. The intuition is that for a ﬁxed number of output observations (T1)t h e
principal has a harder time assigning a theoretically correct payoﬀ to a strategy that was played, and
18thus “lucky” sub-optimal strategies can outperform the optimal one in case it obtains a bad sequence
of output draws. The role of risk aversion, γ, on convergence is not so unambiguous but there is some
evidence in the ﬁgures that higher γ makes convergence in payoﬀs relatively harder.
6 Discussion on Non-Convergence
The following discussion explains in more detail the reasons for the non-convergence of the IEL al-
gorithm in a large fraction of runs observed in the results for both the benchmark and the modiﬁed
algorithms. Our ﬁnding that the standard IEL model with foregone payoﬀs virtually never converges to
the optimal strategy may seem surprising as this algorithm has been previously shown to converge fast
in various environments (e.g., Arifovic and Ledyard, 2004, 2007). In these environments, hypothetical
payoﬀ evaluations are actually very helpful in achieving fast convergence. Foregone payoﬀsp l a yau s e f u l
role in the algorithm’s ability to dismiss strategies that perform poorly. This way, the algorithm has
the ability to make bad strategies disappear from the pool. Foregone payoﬀs also help in evaluating
quickly strategies that are brought in via experimentation - only those that appear promising in terms
of foregone payoﬀs are kept and replicated.
However, our principal-agent problem is diﬀerent from the environments in which IEL has been
studied so far. As we already pointed out, the main problem comes from the fact that in order to eval-
uate a foregone payoﬀ of a strategy that was not actually used, the principal assumes that the observed
agent’s action will remain constant for diﬀerent strategies played by the principal. However, diﬀerent
principal’s strategies in fact result in diﬀerent agent’s optimal actions. Thus the whole collection of
strategies is evaluated given the agent’s action as a constant. Overall, principals who use this type of
algorithm are not able to learn what the optimal contract is.
In addition, even with the inclusion of selective replication and “realized payoﬀs” evaluation of
strategies, the IEL algorithm still experiences diﬃculties in learning the optimal contract compared to
the SEL model. The main reasons are as follows. First, strategies that are generated randomly in the
initial period are assigned zero payoﬀs. In addition, any new strategy generated during simulation via
experimentation is also assigned zero payoﬀ. Those strategies that satisfy the participation constraint
can receive positive payoﬀs only once they have been played. However, strategies with zero payoﬀsw i l l
always have a positive probability of being replicated, and unless they are to be replaced by a strategy
with a positive payoﬀ, they may remain idle in the collection for a long time.
Direct observations of the actual learning process for numerous sample runs indicate that it takes
a fairly long time for the IELR algorithm to eliminate most of the strategies that do not satisfy
the participation constraint. When most of the strategies are on the “right” side of the constraint,
the algorithm displays improvement in performance in terms of strategy payoﬀs and closeness to the
optimal strategy. This is displayed in ﬁgures 9 and 10 which illustrate the evolution of the strategy
pool, Mt, for the best performing versions of the two models, namely SEL with selective replication
(ﬁgure 9) and IELR with selective replication (ﬁgure 10). The ﬁgures show the current strategies in
the pool at various time periods in the strategy (s,f) space, as well as the participation constraint,
for our sample run. Empty circles denote strategies with zero payoﬀs (that have not been played or
that violate the participation constraint), ﬁlled circles denote strategies with positive payoﬀs, diamond
denotes the currently played strategy, and the star denotes the optimal strategy. We see that the better
performance of the social learning model is due to the fact that it weeds out the strategies that violate
the participation constraint quite fast and then converges quickly and stays close to the optimum. In
contrast, the IELR algorithm exhibits ‘cycles’, i.e. gets close to the optimum, but then the pool spreads
out again. It is only once experimentation decays suﬃciently that IELR converges to the currently
19best strategy which is not necessarily the optimal one.
The main problem with IELR and the reason for the behavior exhibited in ﬁgure 10 is that, even if
the optimal strategy appears in the pool at some t, it can, at any later point in time, disappear from
it. This decreases the probability that the algorithm will converge to the optimal contract in any ﬁxed
number of periods. To see this more clearly, suppose that the optimal strategy was in the pool at some
period. One way through which it can be replaced by some diﬀerent strategy is via experimentation.
A second possibility is that it can be replaced by some suboptimal strategy. This can take place in
two ways: either (1) a suboptimal strategy was actually played and had higher payoﬀ than the optimal
strategy that was never played; or (2) because a suboptimal strategy was “lucky” and got a series
of favorable random shocks to y w h i c hr e s u l t e di nap a y o ﬀ higher than the payoﬀ that the optimal
strategy earned last time it was played. In both of these cases, if the number of other replicates of the
optimal strategy in the collection is small or zero, this can be detrimental. The chance of bringing the
optimal strategy back into the strategy pool, especially towards the end of a simulation run when we
are either decreasing the radius, rm (scope) of the experimentation (or its rate, μ) is clearly diminishing
to zero.
In general, given that under IELR not all strategies in the pool are evaluated each period (in fact
only one is), previously ‘lucky’ strategies (i.e. those that have obtained high payoﬀs because of good
output draws) can persist in the pool while better strategies (in terms of theoretically expected payoﬀs)
could be replaced. Furthermore, as the simulation is moving closer to the optimal contract in (s,f)
space, because of experimentation, there might still be a number of points in the strategy pool outside
of the participation constraint, but close to the optimal and near-optimal strategies in the strategy
space. This would also contribute to a slow down or lack of convergence to the optimum.
The above discussion suggests that the SEL algorithm can focus faster on a smaller number of
strategies than the IELR algorithm. This point is further illustrated in ﬁgure 11 which reports the
frequency distribution of the strategies that were ‘active’ (i.e. evaluated and played) during a given
simulation. The frequency of each strategy in G is computed by recording the number of times this
strategy was ‘active’ and dividing it by the total number of evaluations that take place over the course
of a given simulation. The upper panel of ﬁgure 11 shows the frequencies for the SEL algorithm,
and the lower panel shows the frequencies for the IELR algorithm. Comparing the two panels, we
see that the SEL simulation results in higher frequencies of fewer strategies that are concentrated
around the participation constraint and around the optimal strategy. At the same time, the IELR
simulation generates a much more spread-out frequency distribution where a larger number of more
dispersed strategies (including many on the “wrong” side of the participation constraint) were played
and evaluated, with generally lower frequencies.
Does the SEL algorithm only perform better because N strategies (although not necessarily all
diﬀerent) are evaluated per period while only a single strategy is evaluated in IELR in each time
period? In order to put IELR on an equal footing with SEL in terms of the number of strategies that
have been evaluated, we compare the make-up of the strategy pools at time periods where the IELR
number of strategy evaluations equals that of the SEL number of evaluations25. Figure 12 presents the
result of this comparison. In order to obtain equal number of strategy evaluations, we allow 30 (=N)
times as many periods for the IELR algorithm. Thus, the panels in the ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 12 show
the strategy pools at t = 200 for SEL, and at t =6 ,000 for IELR. Similarly, the second row of panels
exhibits the strategy pools for t = 500 for SEL, and t =1 5 ,000 for IELR. Finally, the third row of
panels shows the evolution of the fractions of strategies equal to the optimum and within .05 away from
25Actually, since the strategy pool under SEL will typically contain replicates of the same strategy later in the simulation,
this exercise actually gives an advantage to the IELR model in terms of total number of evaluations.
20the optimum for t =5 0 0for SEL, and t =1 5 ,000 for IELR. It is clear that, even with equal number of
strategy evaluations, the IELR strategy pool remains much more dispersed. In addition, looking at the
evolution of the converging strategy fractions under IELR, we can see that, after some initial progress,
these fractions stabilize around 0.1 for those strategies equal to the optimum, and around 0.25 for those
strategies within 0.05 away from the optimum and stay at these levels until the end of a simulation
(period 15,000). This result conﬁrms our conclusion that the failure of the individual learning model
is mainly due to the host of reasons described above and not to the diﬀerent number of evaluations
performed.
Finally, a feature of our economic model, or any principal-agent model for that matter, that might
cause diﬃculties for the algorithm’s smooth convergence is that strategies that are close to the partic-
ipation constraint, but in terms of distance in (s,f) space further away from the optimal contract can
have higher payoﬀs than strategies that are very close to the optimal strategy in strategy space but
slightly oﬀ the participation constraint (see ﬁgure 3 which displays the theoretical iso-proﬁtl i n e sa n d
the top ten strategies in terms of payoﬀs). This factor, taken together with the impact of replication,
can also prolong the learning time or contribute to the failure of a particular simulation to converge to
the optimal value.
In summary, all of the above eﬀects make the task of learning the optimal strategy using the
individual learning paradigm very diﬃcult as demonstrated in our simulations.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We introduce learning in a principal-agent model and examine whether and what type of learning
processes converge to the theoretically optimal agency contract. The learning models that we look at
are social evolutionary learning (SEL) and three diﬀerent models of individual learning: reinforcement
learning (RL), experience weighted attraction learning (EWA), and individual evolutionary learning
(IEL). In addition, we introduce and evaluate a modiﬁed version of IEL that we call IEL with realized
payoﬀs( I E L R ) .
Overall, our results show that learning in the principal-agent environment is very diﬃcult. This is
due to three main reasons: (1) stochastic environment, (2) discontinuous payoﬀ space in a neighborhood
of the optimal contract due to the participation constraint and (3) incorrect evaluation of foregone
payoﬀs in the sequential game setting of the principal-agent problem. The ﬁrst two factors apply to
all learning algorithms we study while the third one is the main contributor for the failure of the EWA
and IEL models in our setting. In terms of performance of the learning algorithms, our results show
that SEL (especially with selective replication) is the most successful in achieving convergence to the
optimal contract. In contrast, the canonical versions of the individual learning algorithms (IEL, RL
and EWA) generically fail to achieve convergence to the optimal contract.
In order to try to overcome these diﬃculties with convergence to the optimal contract, we introduce
modiﬁcations to our baseline IEL that improve its performance. Speciﬁcally, we modify the algorithm
so that only the payoﬀs of those strategies that are actually tried out are updated. This updating of
the payoﬀs is thus similar to the way updating is implemented in reinforcement learning. However,
we keep important elements of the IEL updating, namely its replication and experimentation opera-
tors, that enable IEL to handle environments with large strategy space well. The resulting modiﬁed
algorithm (IEL with realized payoﬀs) turns out to be much more successful than all other individual
learning models that we studied. The implementation of selective replication further improves IELR’s
performance in terms of convergence to the optimal contract. Still, our main conclusion, based on
numerous robustness checks and parametrizations, is that (in both the canonical algorithms and their
21modiﬁed versions) principals who are learning from each other can achieve much better results than
principals who only learn on their own. Our results operationalize a famous quote from Marshall’s
(1920) “Principles of Economics” related to the informal exchange of ideas and knowledge and diﬀu-
sion of knowledge: “If one man starts new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions
of their own; and thus becomes the source of new ideas”.
How could we test this empirically? As a ﬁrst step, one could use experiments with human subjects.
We are developing an experimental design for two types of environments. In the ﬁrst environment
subjects (who play the role of the principals in the model) learn from their own experience only. In
the second environment, subjects will be given a chance to interact with other subjects and exchange
ideas of what the best strategies are. Given suﬃcient experimental or other data, we can formally test
and distinguish statistically between the social and individual learning models, for example using the
methods developed in Karaivanov and Townsend (2007). IEL agents learn from their own experience
and only the time they have spent on the task (plus maybe an idiosyncratic shock or ﬁxed eﬀect)
should aﬀect how well they perform. In contrast, SEL agents learn from others, in addition to what
they can do on their own. Thus, how many other agents one is in contact with (e.g. data on social
networks, friends, neighbors, etc.) should aﬀect performance in addition to their own experience -
both the strength of the relationships an agent has with others and their number should inﬂuence her
outcome under SEL but not under IEL. Finally, we are also working on extending and applying the
basic framework and methods developed here to other contractual settings such as adverse selection
environments or the increasingly popular dynamic models of asymmetric information (e.g. as those
used in the optimal taxation literature).
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